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the sight of two girls joined together at the back
causes a great many speculations and . . . raises
abundance of questions in divinity, law and
physic. (Jonathan Swift, to Stearne, 1708 in Swift
1963, I, 82)
Introduction
Monsters as a category seem omnipresent in early
modern natural philosophy, in what one might call
a “long” early modern period stretching from the
Renaissance to the late eighteenth century, when
the science of teratology emerges. We no longer
use this term to refer to developmental anomalies
(whether a two-headed calf, an individual suffer-
ing frommicrocephaly or Proteus syndrome) or to
“freak occurrences” like Mary Toft’s supposedly
giving birth to a litter of rabbits, in Surrey in the
early eighteenth century (Todd 1995). But the
term itself has a rich semantic history, coming
from the Latin verb monstrare (itself deriving
from monere, to remind, warn, advise), “to show,”
from which we also get words like “monitor,”
“admonish,” “monument,” and “premonition”;
hence there are proverbs like, in French, le
monstre est ce qui montre, difficult to render in
English: “the monsters is that which shows.”
Scholars have discussed how this “monstrative”
dimension of the monster is in fact twofold: on the
one hand, and most awkwardly, the monster is an
individual who is “pointed at,” who is shown; on
the other hand, the monster is a sign, a portent, and
an omen and in that sense “shows us” something
(on the complex semantic history of the term across
Indo-European languages, see Ochsner 2005). The
latter dimension persists in naturalized form in the
early modern period when authors like Bacon,
Fontenelle, or William Hunter insist that monsters
(or anomalies) can show us something of the
workings of nature.
The Problem of Monsters
Why should philosophy be concerned with mon-
sters at all? If this term referred solely to mythical
figures such as griffins, gorgons, or chimeras, that
is, creatures of our imagination, they would be the
object of philosophical inquiries into the faculties
of the mind and their productions and, by exten-
sion, the demarcation between reason, madness,
and myth. But if we actually open a work of early
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modern philosophy – by Michel de Montaigne,
Francis Bacon, Nicolas Malebranche, John
Locke, or Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, to name a
few – without a predetermined sense of what we
are looking for (such as the usual, mildly anach-
ronistic topics: the theory of ideas, the status of
experiments, or perhaps the defense of a “posi-
tion” on substance, causality, and the like), we
will be struck by the presence of a different kind
of monster: hairy men, “changelings,” “drills,”
conjoined twins, or even children bearing on
their faces the marks of objects their mothers had
coveted. Changelings and drills abound in
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing (Locke 1975), particularly Book III, Chap. VI,
“Of the Names of Substances,” and Book IV,
Chap. IV, “Of the Reality of Knowledge.” In the
introduction to their noted postmodern study of
the topic, Park and Daston describe just such an
experience, in their case when they were graduate
students in a philosophy course: monsters seemed
to loom larger than other standard topics in their
reading assignments (Park and Daston 1998).
At the heart of early modern metaphysics, as
already (but differently) in Aristotle, we find a
concern with nature “missing its target” and pro-
ducing non-viable forms, a concern in which
metaphysical considerations of genus, form and
essence, necessity, and accident collide with
emerging biological science, producing what one
might call an “ontology of the biological world”
(Aristotle 1998, II.8, 199b4). Are these anomalies
a threat to order itself? “Where do anomalies end
and monstrosities begin?” (Guinard 1893, 5). In
order to answer this question – which implies
further issues such as “are monsters anything
other than statistical occurrences?” and “should
the concept of monster be demystified and natu-
ralized, thus giving way that of anomaly?”– phi-
losophy has to enter into the fray of debates on
form, species, and the mechanisms of generation
themselves.
The Renaissance was a period of intense pub-
lication on monsters, whether in sections of books
on broader topics, like Girolamo Cardano’s De
subtilitate (1550) or Michel de Montaigne’s
Essais (1578, 1588; essay XXX of Book II is
famously devoted to “A monstrous child”), or in
self-contained works such as Ambroise Paré’s
Des monstres et des prodiges (1573) and Fortunio
Liceti’s De monstrorum caussis, natura et
differentiis (1616, 1634), or again in treatise on
“specialized topics” like hermaphrodites
(a section of Realdo Colombo’s De re anatomica,
1559, and Jean Riolan,Discours sur les hermaph-
rodites, 1614); “▶ Sexual Dimorphism”. Mon-
sters are also quite present in works we might
consider as “travel narratives,” like Pierre
Boaistuau’s Histoires prodigieuses (1561, 1598),
which we return to below.
As Jean Céard pointed out in his study of
monsters in the Renaissance (Céard 1977/1996),
most classic treatises on generation in that period
devoted a chapter to monsters; Ambroise Paré’s
famous Des monstres et des prodiges is actually
the sequel of an earlier work, De la génération de
l’homme (they occupy books 25 and 24, respec-
tively, of Paré 1628). This may be because acci-
dents in the course of generation, such as the
development of the embryo, call into question
basic intuitions about organic life as a source of
order (Canguilhem 1992, 171). Indeed, such acci-
dents challenge the idea of nature as something
regular and law-like – as a source of order, a
cosmos. As the young Darwin put it in an 1842
note, “If all forms freely crossed, nature would be
a chaos” (Darwin 1996, 94). But of course,
inasmuch as these anomalies seem to cross spe-
cies boundaries, from the wolf-man to the monk-
calf (Munchkalb, cf. Spinks 2015), they also
threaten our sense of what it is to be human, as
appears in this remark by the sixteenth-century
traveler and essayist Pierre Boaistuau:
I remember that St. Augustine, in his book The City
of God, makes mention of sundry monsters or
strange forms, found in deserts or elsewhere, where-
upon grew a question, whether they were descended
of the first man Adam, or had a reasonable soul or
not. . .. (Boaistuau 1569, 111v)
Rather than just being “naturalized” away,
monsters seemed to be stubbornly present in this
philosophical episode, whether as transitional fig-
ures on the way to a “positive science” of teratol-
ogy – as in Bacon or Fontenelle’s comment that
“We commonly regard monsters as games of
naturae [i.e. ludi naturae], but philosophers are
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convinced that Nature does not play games, that it
always follows the same rules, and that all its
components are, so to speak, equally serious [i.-
e. ‘relevant’]. Some may be extraordinary, but
never irregular” (Fontenelle 1703, 28) – or as a
more metaphysical challenge of the sort glimpsed
by Darwin and flaunted by Lucretius and his
Enlightenment avatar, Diderot:
“But since Substance is One, why are Forms so
various?” (Gustave Flaubert, La tentation de saint
Antoine, ch, 7, in Flaubert 1910, 187. This pas-
sage is discussed with a different emphasis in the
opening chapter of Williams 1999.)
Early Modern Philosophical Discussions
of Monsters
Aristotle’s naturalistic approach proved to be
influential especially through the intermediation
of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century
Late Scholasticism. By assuming a Christian
point of view, Franciscus Toledo, the Coimbrans
and Bartholomeus Keckermann, and many others
reassessed, modified, and systematized some of
the concepts around which monsters were
discussed by Aristotle and his medieval followers:
the ends and the fallibility of nature; the contrast
between supernatural, contranatural, and preter-
natural; the notions of impeded and impeding
natures; the relation between particular and uni-
versal natures; and the role of chance and divine
providence (Manzo 2019). They conceived that
the regular course of sublunary nature admits of
exceptions, so that the possibility of being broken
was integral to the very essence of the laws of
nature (leges naturae or consuetudines naturae).
On this account monsters were problematic not
for breaking the laws of nature but for its apparent
lack of purpose. Defective creatures were thought
to be errors of nature resulting from the accidental
or random occurrence of material impediments in
generation (like a small uterus, weak semen,
maternal imagination, etc.). While the progenitors
or impediments themselves do not strive for a
defective outcome, God or the heavens, as univer-
sal causes, do intend them for the sake of variety
and world’s beauty and for the glory of his creator.
In the context of the new sciences, many of the
components of this naturalistic approach
remained. Within this context while the account
of monsters in terms of laws of nature gained
intensity, the concern with discovering nature’s
or God’s purposes faded away. At the turn of the
seventeenth century, Francis Bacon put the ques-
tion of monsters in the agenda of the new sciences
by establishing the need of a natural history of
“pretergenerations” that collects “errors of nature,
vagaries and monsters, where nature deflects and
decline from her ordinary course” (Bacon 2004,
298, our translation). Rather than considering that
monsters are jokes of nature, he describes them as
errors for which matter was the main responsible:
they occur whenever nature is “quite forced to and
ripped from its state by the deformities and rarities
of obstinate and rebellious matter, and by the
violence of impediments” (Bacon 1996, VI,
100). Monsters and prodigious births and other
kinds of pretergenerations are not considered as
breaks of the “forms,” a term denoting the “laws”
of properties like heat, cold, etc., in the Baconian
vocabulary. Instead, they were thought to be fail-
ures that occur by chance in the latent processes
performed by the material and efficient causes.
These instances have a high epistemological
value because they allow to discover the ordinary
paths toward the forms or laws of properties by
showing how they became digressed (Bacon
2004, 298).
Margaret Cavendish shares some points with
Bacon’s view, when she describes monsters as
misshaped, “defective” or “deformed” offspring
caused by “irregular or preternatural” motions
(Cavendish 2001, 198). Besides, she thinks that
most probably they are not “intended by Nature”
but “done by chance,” because sometimes nature
“hath so much work to do (. . .) that she hath not
leisure to be exact” (Cavendish 1671, 565–6).
But, in contrast with this image of an “over-
loaded” nature and in line with Pliny’s tradition
on monsters, Cavendish affirms that nature “loves
variety, and this is the cause of all the strange and
unusual natural effects” (Cavendish 1664, III,
xxxvii, 390–1). In this context, monstrosities
acquire a positive value and are actually intended
by nature in so far as they allow for variety. Finally,
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as many others before (Augustine, Montaigne, the
Late Scholastics), she notes that regularity or irreg-
ularity are epistemological categories with “respect
to particulars, and to our conceptions, because
those motions which move not after the ordinary,
common or usual way ormanner, we call Irregular”
(ib., III, xxix, 360). Strictly speaking there are not
such things as irregular motions in nature “but only
a variety and change of the corporeal motions” (ib.,
IV. xxxiii, 538–539).
Cavendish’s relativization of the notion of
irregularity takes central stage in John Locke’s
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(1690). In Locke’s perspective, monsters are not
a “species” or a “real essence” (not a natural kind,
we would say). Neither are the rest of humans,
which is why it is impossible to say what is a
monster and what is not. In Locke’s opinion, the
irregular and monstrous births that have been
observed in diverse animals suggest that our clas-
sification in terms of essences (whether monstrous
or human) is highly questionable, being “the
workmanship of the Mind” as they are (Locke
1975, III.iii.§14). They also indicate that if there
are essences, nature might not successfully
“reach” the essence it “intends” (“designs”) in
the “production of things” (ibid. III.iv. §16–17).
Consider, for instance, creatures that “have shapes
like ours, but are hairy, and want Language, and
Reason” or others that have speech and reason, by
having “hairy tails.” Locke asks himself “[w]
herein (. . .) consists the precise and unmovable
boundaries of (. . .) species?” Although these rare
creatures are actually classified as men – or not –
only by virtue of our nominal decisions, there
would be no debate about whether a fetus is
human or monstrous if these terms denoted real
essences (ibid. III.iv.§22–27). Locke also worries
about the ethical implications: “If any of these
Creatures had lived and could have spoke, it
would have increased the difficulty. Had the
upper part, to the middle, been of humane shape,
and all below swine, had it been Murther to
destroy it?” (ibid. III.vi.27).
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s appraisal of
Locke’s views in the Nouveaux essais concernant
l’entendement humain (1695) claims that we can
know real essences and classify physical species,
albeit our understanding of this matter is provi-
sional and proportionate to our knowledge
(Leibniz 1978, III.vi.§14). The “loi de la
continuitè” endorsed by him – that bears some
resemblance with the Late Scholastic and
Cavendish’s celebration of variety – entails that
there is no gap in the great chain of being. Fur-
thermore, his principle of universal harmony
involves that there necessarily are species which
have never existed and never will, as they are not
compatible with the succession of creatures that
God has chosen (ibid., III.vi. §12). We must
search for the “interior nature” and not look at
their external marks of beings in order to deter-
mine whether they belong to a species (ib. III.vi.
§14). In the case of man, we certainly know that
his essence consists in rationality (ib., III.vi.§22).
Sometimes children of human progenitors do not
resemble the shape of its parents – possibly due to
the influence of maternal imagination – or are
somehow monstrous (“ont quelque chose de
monstrueux”), but sometimes they reach an age
where they visibly are rational (ib., III.vi.§23;
§27; cf. IV.iv.§16). In sum, against Locke’s
“agnostic” perspective, Leibniz suggests that the
existence of real essences and our ability to know
them does not entail any validation (or invalida-
tion) of the category of “monster.”
Other accounts were more concerned with the
relation of monsters with the laws of nature than
with the issue of the classification of species. In an
important passage of his Primae Cogitationes
circa Generationem Animalium (posthumously
published in 1701), Descartes reflected on the
causes of the generation of monsters and explic-
itly subsumed them under the laws of nature that
he had discussed in Le Monde (1633). He
explained the birth of hermaphrodites resorting
to secondary material and efficient causes and
remarked that these are not “trivial [levis] causes,”
but actually the fundamental ones, namely, “the
eternal laws of nature” (Descartes 1909,
523–524). Further explanations of monsters in
terms of subsumptions under the laws of nature
are to be found in other major figures across the
seventeenth century. Nicolas Malebranche argued
that if “a child comes into the world with a mal-
formed head growing from his breast and which
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makes him wretched (. . .), it is because [God] has
established laws for the communication of
motions, of which these effects are necessary con-
sequences” (Malebranche, Traité de la nature et
de la grâce (1680), in Malebranche 1958–84,
vol. V, p. 32; translation, Malebranche 1992,
p. 118). George Berkeley addressed the same
issue in holding that “[n]atural productions (. . .)
are not all equally perfect.” Moreover, they are
explained by “general rules” from whose “con-
stant observation (. . .) natural evils will some
times unavoidably ensue” (Berkeley 1948–52,
V # 256, 121–122). Robert Boyle maintained a
similar view and evoked the image of nature’s
deviation: “when monsters are said to be preter-
natural things, the expression is to be understood
in regard to that particular species from which the
monster does enormously deviate, though the
causes, that produce that deviation, act but
according to the general laws whereby things
corporeal are guided” (Boyle 1996, 109). In con-
trast to the Late Scholastic perspective, these
authors had conceived that laws of nature as reg-
ularities cannot be broken. For that reason, they
do not explain monsters as exceptions to the laws,
but as effects, that albeit resulting of “contingent”
and “accidental” situations, can ultimately be
explained in terms of “general rules” and
exceptionless “laws.”
Things are regarded quite differently if the
concept of laws of nature is not part of the meta-
physical setting and if teleology is eliminated
since this setting is both materialistic and
deterministic. From this point of view, there are
neither preternatural events and failures, nor jokes
intended by nature. That is the view reflected in
Thomas Hobbes’s interventions in his famous
polemic with Bishop Bramhall initiated in 1645.
In line with the Late Scholastic view, Bramhall
believed that (particular) nature does not intend
the generation of monsters and affirmed that “a
cause may be said to be sufficient, either because
it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the
generation of a man; or else, because it is suffi-
cient to produce that which is produced, as in the
generation of monster.” On Bramhall’s account,
any cause producing a monster should properly be
called “weak and insufficient cause” (Hobbes
1851, V 381; cf. 231–23). Hobbes’s replies that
nature does not have any intentions at all. From
that point of view, it does not have any sense to
maintain that a cause that is actually sufficient
(and necessary) to bring about an effect (e.g., a
monster) is insufficient to produce another effect
(a man) (ib. V 383–384; cf. 236–237). Nature
does not miss its targets, since it does have any
target at all. It simply produces the effects that it
necessarily produces. Hobbes’s refutation not
only is anti-finalistic. It also leaves aside any
resort to accidental causes and to a nomological
view of nature (Psillos and Goudarouli 2019).
Early Modern Anatomico-metaphysical
Debates on Monsters
In the context of disciplines such as anatomy and
medicine, one might say that metaphysics is
equally present: for example, so-called
accidentalists assert that monstrous births are the
result of accidents in the course of development
(e.g., the “shaken eggs,” Tort 1980/1998), in
opposition to the view that there is a kind of
originary monstrosity, but also in opposition to
the so-called thesis of maternal imagination
(according to which a monstrous birth is caused
by desires, fears, sins, or other events affecting the
mother, via her imagination: cf. Paré, Des
Monstres et Prodiges (1573), § XVI; Male-
branche, Rech. Vérité (1674), II-1; the source in
Scripture is the story of Jacob and his sheep, in
Gen. 30: 31–42; see Huet 1993 for discussion).
Works with explicit titles like Daniel Turner’s The
Force of the Mother’s Imagination upon her Foe-
tus in Utero were published (in this case, in
London, 1730). The accidentalist, in response to
all such claims, essentially denies any innate
meaning to monsters and asserts the constitutive
role of chance. Thus Shaftesbury wrote in The
Moralists: “Much less let us account it strange, if
either by outward shock, or by some interior
wound from hostile matter, particular animals
are deformed even in their first conception, when
the disease invades the seats of generation, and
seminal parts are injured and obstructed in their
accurate labors. ‘Tis then alone that monstruous
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shapes are seen” (Shaftesbury 1711/1964, II, 23).
A debate at the Paris Academy of Sciences in the
early 1700s was devoted to exactly this question
(Tort 1980, Ibrahim 2005, Wolfe 2005). For the
accidentalist, a monstrous birth (or monstrous
individual) is simply a different arrangement of
the same parts or perhaps a doubling of the parts
(there is a specific discussion on so-called
“monstres doubles”). Louis Lémery, whose
reports (mémoires) to the Académie des Sciences
in the early 1700s played an important role here –
we might say, although it is a problematic word,
“secularizing” – states: “One commonly under-
stands by ‘monster’, an animal born with a
conformation contrary to the order of nature, that
is, with a structure of the parts quite different from
that which is characteristic of its species” (Sur les
monstres, Premier mémoire (1738), in Lémery
1741, 260; see Ibrahim 1986).
When we speak of anatomical debates and
metaphysical debates as conjoined, we have in
mind statements like Jonathan Swift’s quoted
above as an epigraph, which he wrote in response
to the two Hungarian conjoined twins, Helena and
Judith, who were travelling throughout Europe:
“the sight of two girls joined at the back . . . raises
abundance of questions in divinity, law and
physic” (Swift to Stearne, June 1708, in
Swift1963, vol. 1, p. 82). An implication of the
accidentalist view is that monsters show that there
is no divine order or purpose in the universe – an
idea that will be crucial in the materialist discus-
sion of monsters (Wolfe 2008). In that sense,
accidentalism gets expanded in a philosophically
antifinalist vision, which Diderot’s 1749 Letter on
the Blind is perhaps the greatest example of; Dide-
rot uses the real-life character of Nicholas
Saunderson, a blind mathematician at Cambridge,
to speak out against any idea of design, physico-
theology, or an ordered universe, invoking a
Lucretian vision of forms as the result of chance
combinations of material components.
Interestingly, the Enlightenment is no less rich
in teratologies than periods discussed above, but
one can witness a growing tension between a
discourse in whichmonsters have a kind of special
status (whether as wonders, or simply as natural
objects requiring further investigation), and a
more naturalistic discourse, which for a certain
(actually quite brief) time will take the form of a
positive science of teratology, in which monsters
are simply objects of quantitative, taxonomic
analysis. As the preeminent teratologist, Isidore
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, was to write: “monsters
are not whims of nature. Their organization is
subject to rigorously determined rules, and those
rules are identical to the ones that govern the
animal series. In a word, monsters are other nor-
mal beings; or rather, there are no monsters, and
nature is unified” (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1847,
260). Prominent authors like Buffon, Diderot,
Maupertuis, and Albrecht von Haller wrote essays
on monsters, either in the context of questions of
generation or in more philosophical settings.Were
monsters just “games of nature,” or not? In the
later sixteenth century, Montaigne had written,
“Those whom we call monsters are not so to
God, who sees in the immensity of his work, the
infinity of forms he has comprised in it, and one
must believe that this astonishing figure is related
and linked to some other figure of the same kind,
unknown to man. . . . We call ‘contrary to nature’
that which goes against custom” (Essais, II, 30 in
Montaigne 1998, 601–602). In this statement,
Montaigne is seeking to deflate the traditional
concept of a monster as contra naturam (think
back to Aristotle’s biology and metaphysics) and
in that sense as possessing an essence of its own
(a monstrous essence?). Building on both the
accidentalist anatomical thesis and on a more gen-
eral Lucretian philosophy of nature (Wolfe and
Shank 2019), Diderot turns this into a cosmic
materialist statement: “there are no monsters in
relation to the Whole” (Observations sur
Hemsterhuis, in Diderot 1975-, XXIV, p. 315).
The paradox here is that, given a naturalistic
proclamation of the disappearance of monsters
(and indeed the subsequent erasure of this term
as it became problematic), one should expect the
topic to disappear in the eighteenth century – at
best, to be preserved as a “useful” component of
anatomical inquiry, as William Hunter put it:
“Even monsters, and all uncommon and all dis-
eased animal productions are useful in anatomical
enquiries; as the mechanism or texture which is
concealed in the ordinary fashion of parts, may be
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obvious in a preternatural composition” (Two
introductory lectures: delivered by Dr. Hunter, to
his last course of anatomical lectures, London
1784, 4, cit. in Allchin 2008). Or, in Diderot’s
terms, “the dissection of a monster . . . is more
useful to the historian of nature [i.e., the experi-
mental life scientist or biologist in modern par-
lance] than the study of one hundred individuals
who resemble each other” (“Encyclopédie,” in
Diderot 1975-, VII, p. 242), a claim that would
cause the founder of the history of pre-
tergenerations to have a satisfied smile. Yet curi-
ously, some authors, including notably Diderot,
seem to retain a fascination for monsters, despite
giving good reasons (like Montaigne, but in a
quite different context) for their inexistence.
Conclusion
Since our judgment about what constitutes a
“strange form” or an extreme case of hairiness or
deformity is of course dependent on our percep-
tion, there has been a long tradition of
approaching the problem of monsters from the
viewpoint of “philosophical anthropology,”
focusing on our perception of normality and
abnormality and usually revealing that it is
constructed (socially, historically, culturally) or
structured according to polarities (symbolic, psy-
choanalytic, etc.). This approach can be said to
have its first “patient” in Aristotle, who infa-
mously declared that even a child who does not
resemble its parents is already a kind of monster,
closely followed by “woman” as “the monster of
man” (Aristotle 2000, IV.3, 767 b; see Fritsche
2005). It informs many of the interesting works on
monsters that have appeared in recent years
(notably Kappler 1999, Hanafi 2000 and Bates
2005). This entry has focused more on the prob-
lem of monsters in relation to nature – the laws of
nature, the possibility of a science of nature,
including specific sciences such as embryology,
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